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ABSTRACT
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is a continuously evolving 
process, where many current system elements derive from 
a time when ATM characteristics were very different from to-
day. Nowadays, the provision of ATM services has to design 
new solutions and adapt to new scenarios. Although ESARR 
4 and EU Regulation 1035/2011 define the need of evaluat-
ing ATM system risks before implementing any change, they 
do not define a practical tool to support the decision-mak-
ers. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap, proposing a sys-
tematic methodology; the Preliminary System Safety Assess-
ment Tool (PSSA-T) capable of helping the decision makers 
in evaluating safety implications due to system changes. PS-
SA-T relies on the definition of two Indexes, which have been 
built according to the Aerospace Performance Factor (APF) 
methodology, and allow safety assessment of any proposed 
change. In detail, the former Index compares the evolution-
ary scenario with the current one and the latter evaluates 
the evolutionary scenario in which there is a failure of in-
tervention, in the hypothesis the system change has been 
implemented already. A preliminary study about the change 
from Flight Progress Strip (FPS) to the Electronic-FPS clari-
fies the outcome of the study. 
KEY WORDS
Preliminary System Safety Assessment; Air Traffic Manage-
ment; Aerospace Performance Factor; system change; Pre-
liminary System Safety Assessment Tool;
1. INTRODUCTION
Even though the recent forecasts on air transport 
[1, 2] offer quite different predicted values, they all re-
flect a fast increasing trend. The causes of both car-
go and passenger air travel growth go beyond simple 
macroeconomic factors and regard also structural 
parameters such as distance, populations, activities 
and ideas of mutual interest [3] in addition to envi-
ronmental taxes [4], regulations and emission trading 
schemes [5, 6]. The most important contribution to the 
air transport growth, however, relies on the global eco-
nomic growth and on the increasing competition and 
liberalization, which reduced the average fares and 
expanded the service in terms of route development 
and frequencies. Note that the technological evolution 
in the last decades allowed supporting this ever-in-
creasing air transport demand. In this ever-growing 
scenario, the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system 
increases its importance and acquires the main role, 
evolving from the modest beginnings of the 1950s to 
a sophisticated command and control system, capable 
of taking into account and ruling an integrated vision 
of airports, volumes of airspace, facilities, equipment 
and people [7]. It is therefore necessary to support the 
management of the subsequent complexity, adopting 
significant changes in the current ATM system, e.g. in 
services and procedures, human resources, physical 
infrastructure, systems and technology, regulation 
and standardization, as emerged in the recent SES-
AR Master Plan [8]. It is inevitable that the implemen-
tation of these changes should consider not only the 
performance enhancement but also relevant targets 
in other areas, taking into account the 11 Key Per-
formance Areas (KPAs) [9], i.e. safety, security, envi-
ronmental impact, cost effectiveness, capacity, flight 
efficiency, flexibility, predictability, access and equity, 
participation and collaboration, interoperability. Note 
that safety has the highest priority in aviation [10] and 
changes in any KPAs cannot leave safety performance 
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out of consideration. In Europe, the process of change 
started with the Single European Sky (SES) initiative, 
integrated with the ATM modernization project SESAR 
that gives priority to the developments of significant 
performance gains within KPAs [11].
2.  SYSTEM CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN 
CONTEXT 
The core idea that lies behind ATM changes is that 
they provide significant performance benefits and/or 
form a pre-requisite towards the implementation of a 
target concept. 
This paper examines the safety implications of 
changes that an Air Navigation Service Provider 
(ANSP) has to analyse, evaluate and develop. In de-
tail, taking into account the perspective of an ANSP, it 
is possible to classify the essential changes in opera-
tional changes (operation and procedure) and techno-
logical changes (equipment), considering their direct 
contribution to the system performance. Human factor 
and organizational factor generally constitute a par-
allel effect deriving from operational and technologi-
cal changes. When a technological or an operational 
change is accomplished, it implicitly involves changes 
in the way human beings and institutions as a whole 
interact with other subsystems. Note also that chang-
es in human resources management are operational 
changes that can present a significant contribution to 
the human factor. With respect to the characteristics 
of the change itself, it is possible to obtain different 
effects. A change may be simple and easy to imple-
ment with noticeable operational or environmental 
impact [12]. Otherwise, another change may be com-
plex and involve significant alterations to the current 
situation. Thus, it is necessary to evaluate any change 
by a systematic process, which should give sufficient 
confidence that the system change is feasible from a 
human, operational, technological and safety perspec-
tive.
ICAO Annex 11 in conjunction with ICAO 9859 [13] 
highlights the importance for the ANSP to develop and 
maintain a formal process to identify changes which 
may affect the level of safety risk associated with its 
aviation products or services and to identify and man-
age the safety risks that may arise from those chang-
es. Several national institutions develop mandatory 
process to follow for the ATM airspace change, e.g. the 
UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) [14], or manuals for 
setting out the change management process, e.g. the 
North European Functional Airspace Block (NEFAB) 
[15, 16] and the Airports Authority of India (AAI) [17, 
18]. CAA, NEFAB, AAI reports describe the phases of 
an ATM change, integrating it in the lifecycle of the 
system. Even though the representations differ in the 
taxonomy and in some details of the processes, they 
present common features and it is possible to extract 
a common core. In Europe, it may be helpful to high-
light the contribution of ESARRs, i.e. the safety regula-
tory requirements that aim to represent an element of 
a harmonized framework for the ATM safety regulation. 
In this paper, particular attention is paid to ESARR3 
and to ESARR4. ESARR3 mandates the implementa-
tion and use of Safety Management Systems (SMS) by 
ATM service providers in order to ensure a prompt ad-
dress to all the safety issues and risks within the provi-
sion of the ATM service. ESARR4 develops further ES-
ARR3 requirements on risk assessment and mitigation 
and on the documentation of the process, its results 
and conclusions. ESARR4 exploits the use of a quan-
titative risk-based approach when introducing and/or 
planning changes to the ATM system from a safety per-
spective, covering human, procedural and equipment 
elements, in order to analyse the safety consequences 
of the change. ESARR4 does not address the tech-
nological assessment of introducing and/or planning 
organizational or management changes to the ATM 
service provision [19]; it aims to support the imple-
mentation of a systematic assessment and control of 
the safety impact of any ATM system changes. Within 
the overall objective of ensuring safety, the objective 
of ESARR4 is to ensure that the systematic and formal 
identification, assessment and management of risks 
associated with hazards achieves safety levels that, 
as a minimum, meet those approved by the designat-
ed regulatory authority. ESARR4, however, constitutes 
an ideal requirement, rather than a practical tool to 
support the decision-makers [20]. In 2011, the EU 
Regulation 1035/2011 “Common Requirements for 
the Provision of Air Navigation Services” [21] trans-
posed ESARR4 into the European Community law. 
Among other features, this Regulation sets specific 
requirements for risk assessment and mitigation with 
regard to changes to the functional ATM system: an 
ATM service provider shall provide a systematic risk as-
sessment and mitigation process to ensure the hazard 
identification for any changes to the ATM system, ad-
dressing the involvement of the specific components 
and their relative interactions. 
This general perspective defines the risk assess-
ment process that develops along with the lifecycle of 
the system [22]. In particular, it is possible to distin-
guish several phases of the two parallel processes, as 
shown in Figure 1.
The first stage of the system lifecycle is the Defini-
tion, which includes the evaluation of the current sys-
tem performance and the identification of an improve-
ment. A prompt evaluation of this need should confirm 
the relevance of the evolving request. In this phase, 
the risk assessment perspective, it is necessary to 
develop a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA). FHA 
analyses the potential consequence on safety result-
ing from the loss or degradation of system functions. 
FHA determines qualitatively the severity of each 
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hazard and places them in classes to determine their 
maximum tolerable occurrence.
SYSTEM LIFECYCLE RISK ASSESSMENT
FHA
PSSA
System Safety 
Assessment (SSA)
Definition
Design
Implementation
Integration
Transfer to Operations
Operations 
Maintenance
Decommissioning
Figure 1 – Change Management process scheme (adapted 
from [15])
The following lifecycle stage, i.e. Design, defines 
and constructs the change in all its features, producing 
the formal documentation for the Regulatory authority. 
In this phase, the risk assessment develops a Prelim-
inary System Safety Assessment (PSSA). PSSA exam-
ines the new system architecture and determines how 
failures and/or external events could cause or contrib-
ute to generate hazards and their effects, identified 
in the FHA, supporting the selection and validation of 
mitigations. PSSA consists of a formal operational and 
technical evaluation, verifying the requirements and 
assessing the impact on operational performance, 
cost efficiency and safety. 
Following Design, in the system lifecycle there is 
the Implementation, which covers the development 
of the individual elements, and the Integration, which 
covers their integration in the system. The lifecycle 
continues then to the Transfer to Operations, which 
covers the installation and integration of the change in 
the operational environment, in addition to its valida-
tion. Then the Operations Maintenance reflects all the 
preventive and corrective actions to be performed in 
order to maintain the desired service and safety level 
and the Decommissioning provides the system with-
drawal from the operation.
During all these stages, it is necessary to develop a 
System Safety Assessment (SSA) to collect arguments, 
evidences and assurances to ensure that each system 
element, as implemented, meets its safety require-
ments and the system as a whole meets its safety ob-
jectives throughout its lifetime. A continuous process 
of comparing current performances and safety objec-
tives should confirm the achievement of the targets. 
Note that FHA, PSSA and SSA reflect the core concept 
of ESARR3 SMS even in the case of a system change 
process. In this sense, PSSA acquires the crucial role 
because it authorizes the future implementation and 
integration of the change in the system structure, in a 
systematic way as prescribed in ESARR4 [19].
3.  PSSA-T: PRELIMINARY SYSTEM SAFETY 
ASSESSMENT TOOL
PSSA is a complex task [23] to be executed during 
the Design phase of the system lifecycle and at any 
time when there is a change in the system framework, 
the PSSA should ensure the ability of the new architec-
ture to meet the old and/or new safety requirements 
and targets. The tool developed in this paper, i.e. the 
PSSA-T, helps the safety managers to:
 – demonstrate to third parties, e.g. the regulator, that 
risks have been reduced to an acceptable level;
 – maintain a record of decisions and ensure that fur-
ther changes will not invalidate the assessment or 
will not lead to unnecessary repetitions;
 – support the hand-over of safety responsibilities.
The Preliminary System Safety Assessment Tool 
(PSSA-T) analyses and organizes in a systematic, clear 
and user-friendly way, the prescriptions of the PSSA 
for an ATM system change. PSSA-T proposes a two di-
mensions evaluation, in order not to neglect the con-
sequences of an ATM system change. It firstly propos-
es a comparison between the current and the future 
scenarios, about the different features that contribute 
to ATM safety performance (Safety Impact of Change - 
SIC). In addition, to ensure that the change would not 
jeopardize the safety in the future scenario, a second 
evaluation compares the impact of a potential failure 
of the proposed change, with a failure in the current 
scenario (Safety Impact of Failed Change - SIFC). 
By this process, PSSA-T produces two different 
metrics; one for SIC and one for SIFC, that represent 
the expected variation of safety performance after the 
implementation of the change and the variation of 
safety performance in case of a failure of the change. 
If both evaluations are positive, PSSA-T confirms the 
opportunity of implementing the change, enabling 
further steps of the system lifecycle and risk assess-
ment. If any evaluation is negative, it is mandatory to 
identify the risks that cause the safety performance 
degradation and determine mitigating action to an ac-
ceptable level, based on the Indexes outcome. If miti-
gations can restore the safety performance, the safety 
manager can authorize the system change; otherwise, 
they have to reject it. Both evaluations take into ac-
count the main features of the ATM system, develop-
ing performance indicators capable of describing its 
complexity. Filling a still open gap in the factor analysis 
[24], this research evaluates the technical, human and 
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organizational factors, according to EUROCONTROL 
prescriptions [23]. 
According to a general approach, it is possible to 
sketch the system as a multi-level process, accord-
ing to the detail level of interest. In particular, the SIC 
(and SIFC) Index has to consider technical, organiza-
tional and human contribution. In this scheme, the 
Equipment (software and hardware components of 
the whole architecture) that enable communication, 
navigation, surveillance and information (traffic and 
weather) systems, represent the technical factors. 
Procedures, including e.g. flight, operational, mainte-
nance and airspace sectorisation, represent the orga-
nizational factors; Human factors reflect the contribu-
tion of the human resources and their relations to the 
ATM system (e.g. coordination, responsibility, human 
performances), the human-machine interface (HMI) 
and the ergonomics of the workstation. In order to sup-
port PSSA-T, a more detailed description and further 
contextualization of the three macro-factors, identify-
ing the sub-functions that each factor considers are 
necessary. Note that the interactions among sub-func-
tions could be very complex to be described and they 
could be different in the SIC or SIFC evaluation. To this 
extent, Aerospace Performance Factor (APF) method-
ology [25] has been adopted for the safety assess-
ment in ATM. The APF, widely explained in its theoret-
ical steps in [26, 27], has proved itself useful both for 
reactive analysis [28] and for forecasting the airspace 
safety level [29]. APF could help defining the system 
safety performance and providing a balance measure 
of each sub-function, in order to support a more con-
sistent assessment and thus, better decisions.
3.1 The Aerospace Performance Factor
The five general steps of APF can be adapted, for 
SIC and SIFC purpose, as follows:
Determine the factors that influence the performance.
Starting from the three macro-factors, derive the 
list of sub-functions through a process of system de-
composition. This can be accomplished by convening 
a panel of experts from different divisions within the 
organization (senior management, flight operations, 
dispatch, training, maintenance, flight crew, safety 
team), including also people with fresh eyes and no 
bias towards one or more particular sources of infor-
mation, i.e. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). 
Determine the information available on those factors.
Repeat the APF analysis, each time a PSSA-T is 
required. Note that it is important to evaluate the ad-
ditional workload on the panel of experts, minimizing 
it by using general frameworks and sharing common 
knowledge, if possible.
Organize the influencing factors.
Divide the sub-factors into categories in order to 
constitute the APF Mind Map, a graphical depiction 
of the relationships among the elements in analysis. 
The Mind Map provides the foundation to develop the 
APF and aids the company as a whole simply by going 
through the APF development process. Note that it is 
possible to set a desired number of levels, and that the 
number of factors in each level can be different, in ac-
cordance with the target of the study. Additional levels 
characterize a more detailed Mind Map. The Mind Map 
drives the questions to ask the SMEs. 
Determine the relative importance or weighting of the 
factors.
What makes the APF methodology different is the 
way it treats each element and identifies its contribu-
tion to safety performance. Decision-makers need to 
know the significance of each element in order to as-
sess the impact of any intervention. For that reason, 
APF suggests the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to 
provide a formal weighting process, ensuring at the 
same time the validation of the information. This pro-
cess relies on SME judgments and represents the core 
idea of the APF.
Display information for decision-makers.
Provide a comprehensive and intuitive picture of 
the results, in terms of safety performance, graphical-
ly displaying the weighted Mind Map values and their 
potential changes, iterating the SIC or SIFC process, if 
necessary, to evaluate the adoption of modifications to 
the initially proposed system change. 
APF relies on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), 
a multi-criteria decision-making tool developed by 
Saaty in the early 1970s. AHP permits to obtain a hier-
archical structure that combines different functions of 
a system and translates SMEs’ evaluations into quan-
titative weights.
3.2 The Analytic Hierarchy Process
AHP fundamental steps [30] can be adapted for 
evaluating PSSA as follows: 
Define the problem and determine the kind of knowl-
edge sought.
SMEs have to determine the factors that influence 
safety performance with respect to the system change 
itself (for SIC) and with respect to a potential failure of 
the change on the future system (SIFC).
Structure the decision hierarchy.
It is necessary to build the hierarchy from the top 
with the goal of the process, through intermediate lev-
els (factors and sub-factors) to the lowest level of the 
hierarchy. Note that the structure may be different for 
SIC and SIFC.
Build a set of pairwise comparison matrices. 
For each level, compare sub-factors with respect to 
their impact on the upper factor in the hierarchy. Pair-
wise comparisons express SME’s relative judgment 
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between two factors in a 9-degree scale of importance 
(1=equal, 3=moderate, 5=strong, 7=very strong, 
9=extreme) and a reciprocal value is assigned to the 
inverse comparison (aij=1/aji where aij(aji) denotes the 
importance of the i-th (j-th) element). 
Extract the relative weights of each factor from the 
pairwise comparison. 
The AHP mathematical modelling follows the sub-
sequent stages for each pairwise comparison matrix A:
 – calculate the eigenvalues λ of the matrix A, along 
with the consistency index:
( )det I 0A m- =  (1)
I n
n
1C
maxm= -
-  (2)
If IC<0.1, the matrix is consistent and the judge-
ments are not contradictory;
 – calculate the eigenvectors x:
(A–λI)x=0 (3)
where the one with λmax identifies the priority vec-
tor;
 – normalize the priority vector to 1 to obtain the rel-
ative weights of the different factors of the hierar-
chic structure;
 – repeat an analogue procedure to define relative 
weights of each level of factors and sub-factors;
 – combine the weights of factors and sub-factors to 
determine their absolute weights. To obtain the ab-
solute weight of the sub-factor, it is necessary to 
multiply the relative weight of a sub-factor by the 
relative weights of all the factors (connected to the 
sub-factor in its upper hierarchy).
To create the SIC (and SIFC) APF Indexes, the own-
er of PSSA-T, i.e. an expert of the ANSP safety depart-
ment, needs to assess the current and future scenarios 
according to the factors that influence safety. Consid-
ering the AHP framework, the only judgements to be 
expressed are the comparisons of the two scenarios 
(the alternatives) for each sub-factor of the lowest lev-
el of hierarchy. While in SIC the alternatives represent 
the current and future scenarios, in SIFC they repre-
sent the effect of a failure on both scenarios. In the 
hypothesis that the hierarchy has number I of levels, 
the I-th Index is obtained by multiplying the direct judg-
ments of the expert of the ANSP safety department by 
the I-th AHP absolute weight of sub-factors, as shown 
in Equation 4. The generic (I-i)-th Index is obtained by 
rolling up the lower Index as shown in Equation 5. 
L Index L AHP weight L Jugmentl l l$=  (4)
L Index k L AHP weight k
L Index j
( ) ( )
( )
l i l i
l i
j
J
1
1
( )I i k1
$
$
=- -
- +
=
- +
^
^
^
^
h
h
h
h
/  (5)
where i=1,… I; LI judgment represents the judgment 
of the ANSP safety department experts and LI AHP 
weight its absolute weight; k represents the k-th Index 
and J(I-i+1)(k) the number of sub-factors in the lower lev-
el with respect to the k-th Index, i.e. L(I-i) Index (k). If 
i=I, the PSSA-T generates the L0 Index that sums up 
the overall risk of the system change (SIC and SIFC In-
dexes). According to APF methodology, this risk can be 
broken down into its components to analyse the spe-
cific factors in different level of detail by checking the 
corresponding L(I-i) Index. It is now necessary to make 
an in-depth analysis of the LI judgment with respect to 
SIC and SIFC purpose.
Note that SIC represents essentially a comparison 
of the safety characteristics of the system change en-
visioned in the future scenario with the current system 
in the current scenario. In order to facilitate the SIC 
assessment, the ANSP expert has to rate the alterna-
tives on a -9/+9 scale. In this scale, the more nega-
tive the judgment, the safer the expert considers the 
performance in the current scenario without changes. 
Otherwise, the more positive the judgment, the safer 
the expert considers the system change envisioned in 
the future scenario.
On the other hand, although the structure of the 
APF Index does not change, the scale for LI judgment 
is substantially different for SIC and SIFC. In SIFC, 
there is no need to compare the scenario before and 
after the change. It is only strictly necessary to make 
a safety assessment in which the change just imple-
mented may fail. Therefore, a scale -9/0 represents 
the system safety reduction in case of a failure of the 
proposed change where the lower the value, the high-
er the safety reduction and vice versa.
Furthermore, even though the structure of the SIC 
and SIFC APF Mind Map are generally different for dif-
ferent system changes, it could be useful to define a 
general framework, valid for each type of change. The 
advantage, in this case, consists of not compromising 
the APF weights. For this purpose, it is necessary to 
build a dynamic APF, deleting those sub-factors that 
are not affected by the specific system change and 
make them non-dimensional, based on their relative 
weights. This process would be quicker, if compared to 
the entire AHP weighting process. Figure 2 shows an ex-
ample of a generic SIC APF Mind Map, as a reference 
point to develop more detailed analyses. More spe-
cifically, Figure 2 describes SIC-Level0-Index, SIC-Lev-
el1-Index and SIC-Level2-Index.
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Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
SIC
Equipment
Procedure
Human Factor
Communication
Navigation
Surveillance
ATM Information
MET Information
Flight Procedure
Operative Procedure
Sectorization 
Procedure
Maintenance
Procedure
Organisation
Human Computer
Interaction
Ergonomics
Figure 2 –APF Mind Map for SIC
4.  PRELIMINARY APPLICATION
This Section shows a preliminary application of the 
PSSA-T, concerning the validation process of a technical 
system change, which has impact both on the pro-
cedure and on the human factor: the evolution from 
traditional paper flight progress strip (FPS) to electron-
ic FPS (EFPS). The change consists of implementing 
EFPS in an Aerodrome Control Tower (TWR) with low 
traffic demand. 
The first step consists of defining the SIC and SIFC 
Mind Map, taking into account all the factors the an-
alysed system change may affect. In this case study, 
by the contribution of SMEs, it is possible to devel-
op a three-level Mind Map both for SIC and for SIFC, 
based on their expertise in the field and on a broad 
literature review. The Mind Maps acknowledge factors 
which take into account the relevant role of user inter-
face [31], as well as the ergonomic aspects of the FPS 
emerging from the experience in the field in [32, 33], 
and the typical potential sources of error for Air Traffic 
Controllers (ATCOs). 
Then, the ACC safety manager and five ATCOs fill 
a specific questionnaire to express judgments on the 
change. Figure 3 describes the complete SIC Mind Map 
at Level 2, while Table 1 depicts the respective Index 
values. For example, with reference to the complete 
SIC Mind Map in Figure 3, the specific questions relat-
ed to Surveillance (Equipment) would be:
 –  Service Quality: How do you judge the variation of 
safety level in terms of service quality? (noise, data 
integrity, delay on transmission for information)
 –  Data Elaboration: How do you judge the variation of 
safety in terms of data elaboration? (quantity, effi-
ciency and correlation of information)
It is possible to present some common points, 
emerging from the questionnaires. Many ATCOs, han-
dling the strips, rearrange them and mentally regis-
ter the evolution of traffic by these movements [34]. 
Some ATCOs could prefer the paper strip just because 
they prefer to have unlimited possibilities to annotate 
them according to personal style. Although this feature 
could simplify personal comprehension, it makes the 
coordination more complex and exposed to misunder-
standings. In addition, different ATCOs’ expertise could 
cause different detail and accuracy levels in filling in 
the strips. This factor complicates the coordination, 
too. In conclusion, the general scepticism in case of 
a power failure or, more general, EFPS system fail-
ure, makes ATCOs generally more favourable to paper 
strips, which would not fail, at least not in the standard 
sense. Otherwise, in case of large or critical traffic vol-
ume, EFPS could help in managing complex situations 
with particular reference to the ease of coordination. 
EFPS also permits to have historic data on movements, 
in case it would be necessary to analyse past data, ei-
ther for investigations or for statistics. Note also that 
EFPS system is compatible with other airport systems 
(e.g. A-SMGCS, FIDS, De-ice, AFTN) and could ease the 
management of maintenance procedure of line oper-
ations through an easier intercommunication between 
ATCOs and maintenance operators.
In conclusion, SIC-Level0-Index positive value re-
flects a situation in which the safety level in the ACC 
is not reduced with the introduction of EFPS. Note that 
the only SIC-Level2-Index feature offering a negative 
value (i.e. Ergonomics) reflects the ATCOs’ point of 
view, which generally prefers paper FPS. The positive 
safety contribution of other factors mitigates this nega-
tive contribution. SIC Index allows a positive evaluation 
of the EFPS implementation consequences in terms 
of safety.
On the other hand, SIFC-Level0-Index results in a 
negative value, which determines the rejection of the 
change. In this case, it is necessary to go back up to 
the causes of this value, and define, if possible, correc-
tive actions to decrease the risks and evaluate again 
SIFC. 
Table 1 shows that Procedure has no contribution 
to negative SIFC Level0-Index and it is thus necessary 
to focus on Equipment and Human Factor, which has 
negative SIFC-Level1-Indexes. For example, it may be 
appropriate to maintain the traditional paper FPS sys-
tem in a dedicated framework, situated in an ergonom-
ic position within the EFPS vicinity and consider addi-
tional training for the ATCOs. These interventions have 
to be translated into modifications of the proposal sys-
tem change, in the Design phase, which is developed 
along the PSSA. Once accomplished the proposed 
modifications to the system change proposal, PSSA-T 
has to be applied again to check if the mitigating ac-
tions lead to a safety enhancement, proceeding then 
with the other steps of the system lifecycle.
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Clearness of information
Clearness of information
Compatibility with 
maintenance procedures
Compatibility with 
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Figure 3 – SIC APF Mind Map for the System Change: from FPS to EFPS
Table 1 – Level 0, Level 1, Level 2 - SIC and SIFC index 
values
Index 
Level
Function SIC 
Index
SIFC 
Index
Level 0 Overall Index 4.85 -3.24
Level 1 Equipment 4.70 -4.47
Level 2 Communication 6.00 -4.84
Level 2 Navigation 3.00 -4.00
Level 2 Surveillance 4.00 -4.25
Level 1 Procedure 7.40 0.00
Level 2 Operative Procedure 8.00 0.00
Level 2 Maintenance Procedure 7.00 0.00
Level 1 Human Factor 2.50 -4.83
Level 2 Organisation 4.00 -5.80
Level 2
Human Computer 
Interaction
4.50 -7.50
Level 2 Ergonomics -3.00 1.25
5.  CONCLUSIONS
Systems changes represent frequent needs for 
the current ATM system, which has to face increas-
ing volumes and subsequent interactions complexity. 
Because it is not possible to design a system change 
without taking into account its safety consequences, 
this paper proposes a PSSA-T, a methodology for or-
ganizing in a systematic and customizable way, the 
Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA). PSSA-T 
relies upon APF and allows, by SMEs’ evaluations, to 
define two multi-level Indexes, i.e. SIC and SIFC. These 
Indexes allow a clear and user-friendly safety assess-
ment respective of the change envisioned in the future 
scenario with the current system in the current sce-
nario, and of a potential failure of the system in the 
envisioned scenario. 
The good outcomes related to the  preliminary im-
plementation of PSSA-T for the safety implications of a 
change from FPS to EFPS, offer positive expectations 
related to this approach, permitting to identify risks as-
sociated with the process and guidelines for possible 
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interventions to mitigate them. Future research would 
need to define more detailed Mind Maps, to allow a dy-
namic APF weighting process, also specifying generic 
questionnaires [35]. Furthermore, in line with recent 
research in the field of Resilience Engineering [36], 
it would be relevant to consider how the system resil-
ience might affect the change assessment process de-
rived by PSSA-T, adopting a systemic perspective.
The reproducibility and its user-friendly core struc-
ture make PSSA-T a useful and easy tool to help deci-
sion-makers to make better decisions and to face fu-
ture evolutions of the ATM system in a systematic way.
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VALUTAZIONE DELLA SICUREZZA PER UNA MODIFI-
CA AL SISTEMA DI GESTIONE DEL TRAFFICO AEREO: 
UNA METODOLOGIA PER GLI ANSP 
SOMMARIO
La gestione del traffico aereo, Air Traffic Management 
(ATM), è un processo in continua evoluzione, dove molteplici 
elementi derivano da un periodo storico in cui le caratteris-
tiche del sistema erano estremamente differenti da quelle 
odierne. Al giorno d’oggi, è necessario quindi progettare 
nuove soluzioni capaci di adattarsi ai nuovi scenari. ESARR 
4 ed EU 1035/2011 definiscono la necessità di valutare i 
rischi associati al sistema ATM prima di implementare una 
qualsivoglia modifica, ma non forniscono un supporto oper-
ativo per i decisori. Questo paper ambisce a colmare tale la-
cuna, proponendo una metodologia sistemica, il Preliminary 
System Safety Assessement Tool (PSSA-T), con l’intento di 
supportare il decisore a valutare le implicazioni, in materia 
di sicurezza, dovute a una modifica del sistema ATM. Il PS-
SA-T si fonda sulla definizione di due indici distinti, costruiti 
secondo l’Aerospace Performance Factor (APF), applicabile 
per la valutazione di qualsiasi cambiamento sistemico. Più 
in dettaglio, il primo indice compara lo scenario evoluto (ip-
otizzando applicata la modifica) con quello attuale, mentre 
il secondo indice valuta lo scenario evoluto caratterizzato da 
una avaria della modifica apportata. Uno studio preliminare 
riguardante il cambiamento dal sistema di Flight Progress 
Strip (FPS) all’ Electronic-FPS chiarisce i risultati dello studio.
PAROLE CHIAVE
Preliminary System Safety Assessment; Gestione del traffic 
aereo; Aerospace Performance Factor; modifica sistemica; 
Preliminary System Safety Assessment Tool;
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